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In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that video games are equivalent to other forms of media for First
Amendment purposes. This decision should have put video games in the same category
as other forms of non-commercial, expressive speech for purposes of the right of
publicity. This article reviews the post-Brown decisions to determine the current place
of video games within the caselaw. The result of that review is that games are still in
a transitional stage, no longer merchandise as a matter of doctrine, but not yet
receiving the same treatment as books, films, and other forms of traditional media.
The tension between doctrine and case outcomes cannot last, but the right cases have
not yet come along to force courts to confront the discrepancy.
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SO ARE GAMES COFFEE MUGS OR WHAT?
GAMES AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY REVISITED
WILLIAM K. FORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association 1 was about the ability of the government to restrict minors’ access to
violent video games,2 but the implications of the Court’s holding were broader. The
Court held not only that video games are protected by the First Amendment, a
determination that hardly broke new ground,3 but the Court also equated video games
to books and films for First Amendment purposes.4 Treating video games in the same
way as more traditional forms of media could have changed the way video games—and
maybe games generally—are treated for purposes of the right of publicity. Generally
speaking, books and films can use the names and likenesses of real people, both living
and dead, without getting permission from the person or the person’s estate. When no
other defense applies, such as a statutory exemption,5 courts usually recognize First
Amendment protection for books and films from right of publicity claims.
Traditionally, games have not fared as well. Beginning with a “seminal” 1967
state court decision involving board games, 6 games have instead been treated like
celebrity memorabilia, like coffee mugs and t-shirts adorned with celebrity names or
likenesses.7 Using names and likenesses on merchandise, unlike in books and films,
generally does require permission. 8 But Brown had the potential to change this

* © 2020 William K. Ford. Ford is a Professor of Law at UIC John Marshall Law School in Chicago,
Illinois. Thanks to Raizel Liebler and Shannon Ford for comments on various drafts.
1 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
2 Id. at 805.
3 See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir.
2003); William K. Ford, The Law and Science of Video Game Violence: What was Lost in Translation,
31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 312 (2013) (collecting cases).
4 564 U.S. at 790 (“Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as
characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the
player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”).
5 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(2) (Deering 2020) (exempting books, audiovisual works,
radio programs, television programs, and other types of works from liability under the statutory right
of publicity provisions covering deceased personalities).
6 Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967). The Third Circuit
referred to Palmer as a “seminal” case in Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013).
7 See William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the Right of
Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 21-36 (2013).
8 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 2020) (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or
goods . . . without such person’s prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of his parent
or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a
result thereof.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(1) (Deering 2020) (“Any person who uses a deceased
personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
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situation, to provide the same freedom to video game producers that is enjoyed by
biographers, historians, documentarians, and even the makers of fictional works. So
what happened? Eight years after Brown, are video games now like books and films,
or are they still like coffee mugs and T-shirts?
The answer is that games are still more like coffee mugs and T-shirts, but the
prediction of this article is that we should expect change and we should expect it to
happen sooner rather than later. The small assortment of post-Brown lower court
decisions has indeed failed to drag games out of the merchandise category for purposes
of the right of publicity. But the leading decisions have been close. The Third Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit panels were both divided.9 These divisions occurred even though
both cases were hardly the best ones for the video game defendants, insofar as they
dealt with sports simulation games long subject to licensing.10 Judge Thomas Ambro,
dissenting from the Third Circuit’s decision, called out his colleagues for applying a
“medium-specific metric” to video games,11 and neither the Third Circuit nor the Ninth
Circuit majorities could explain why, post-Brown, book and film publishers can create
realistic works with real people but video game publishers cannot. At some point, the
courts will be forced to face, rather than evade, the inconsistency.
There has yet to be a reported appellate opinion involving a video game’s
unauthorized use of a real person in a traditional narrative, whether informative or
entertaining, non-fictional or fictional. The one case actually involving a fictionalized
story with a real individual did result in a ruling for the video game defendants, but
this decision was made by a state trial court in an unreported order and involved a
very unsympathetic plaintiff.12 While courts may preserve a narrow carve-out for the
already decided cases involving sports simulations,13 an appellate court will eventually
confront a case involving a narrative similar to what’s found in typical films and
televisions shows and find it untenable to distinguish away the cases involving these
other forms of media. When this happens, games will no longer be coffee mugs.

merchandise, or goods . . . without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdivision
(c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”).
9 See Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart, 717 F.3d at 170. In Hart,
the Third Circuit reversed a district court decision favorable to video game producers, but even the
district court did not treat the video games at issue as we would expect traditional forms of media to
be treated. In ruling for the defendant on summary judgment, the district court focused heavily on
the ability of players of the games to alter the visual appearance of the plaintiff’s avatar. Id. at 166
(“Indeed, the ability for users to change the avatar accounted, in large part, for the District Court’s
deciding that NCAA Football satisfied the Transformative Use Test.”). Makers of films do not provide
viewers with an opportunity to alter the appearance of real people, yet filmmakers generally prevail
in these cases. On the other hand, the district court did at least consider “several creative elements
apart from Hart’s image” and rejected a narrow focus on only the avatar, instead saying the game
should be considered as a whole. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 784, 787 (D.N.J. 2011),
rev’d, Hart, 717 F.3d. at 170.
10 See Ford & Liebler, supra note 7, at 33-36.
11 Hart, 717 F.3d at 174 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
12 Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27,
2014).
13 The same point might apply to music simulations, given the No Doubt case discussed below.
See infra notes 119–126 and accompanying text (discussing No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192
Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011)).
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II. DISCUSSION14
The right of publicity is governed by state law. Therefore, any discussion of the
right of publicity depends upon generalizations about the varying laws of many
different jurisdictions. Nevertheless, sound generalizations are possible. According to
McCarthy and Schechter’s leading treatise on the subject, “The right of publicity is
simply the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or
her identity.”15 A person’s identity includes his or her name and likeness, but it can
also include other aspects of a person’s identity, such as a person’s voice or signature.16
Some decisions have gone even further, perhaps too far. Protectable identities can
include catchphrases that remind people of someone (e.g., the phrase “Here’s Johnny,”
which evokes Johnny Carson)17 or scenes that remind people of a particular person
(e.g., a robot with a blond wig on a set reminiscent of Wheel of Fortune, which evokes
Vanna White).18
The right of publicity is commonly described as confusing and even a mess.19 The
confusion begins with its historical development.20 Older cases and nearly all cases
decided under New York law rely on the right of privacy rather than the right of
publicity. 21 New York’s “right of publicity” is actually limited to the statutory
protections for privacy in sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, which
prohibits non-consensual uses of a person’s “name, portrait, picture or voice . . . for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade” 22 Some courts draw a sharp
distinction between the rights of privacy and publicity, with the former protecting
emotional interests and the latter protecting economic interests, 23 but as Professor
14 The background included in this discussion is brief and even avoids the standard invocations
of Warren & Brandeis, Prosser, and Nimmer. A thorough history, complete will all the usual suspects,
plus new historical details and analysis, can be found in Jennifer Rothman’s recent book on the topic.
See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 11-86 (2018).
15 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
3:1 (2d ed. 2019). See also id. at § 1:3 (“Today it is possible to state with clarity that the right of
publicity is simply this: it is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of
his or her identity.”).
16 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 2020).
17 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834-37 (6th Cir. 1983).
18 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992).
19 Ashley Messenger, Rethinking the Right of Publicity in the Context of Social Media, 24
WIDENER L. REV. 259, 259 (2018) (“Right of publicity law is famously a mess.”); Ettore v. Philco
Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956) (“The state of the law is still that of a
haystack in a hurricane[.]”).
20 See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 30-44 (“From the Ashes of Privacy”).
21 See Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (explaining how under
New York law “the ‘right of publicity’ is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an aspect of the
right of privacy”); Palmer, 232 A.2d at 459 (“Plaintiffs contend that the use of their respective names
reduces their ability to obtain satisfactory commercial affiliation by licensing agreements and that
such use is an invasion of their privacy and an unfair exploitation and commercialization of their
names and reputations. In essence, the issue here is whether defendant, on the statement of facts
detailed herein, has violated and continues to violate plaintiffs’ rights of privacy.”).
22 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (2020); Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 583-84.
23 See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 173 W. Va. 699, 714 n.6 (W.Va. 1983) (“This ‘right of privacy’
is not to be confused with the ‘right of publicity’ first recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) . . . . The right of privacy protects individual
personality and feelings, the right of publicity protects the commercial value of a name or likeness.”).
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Jennifer Rothman argues, the divide between the two doctrines is often overstated.24
Outside of New York, the relevant contemporary cases usually refer to the right of
publicity when dealing with the unauthorized commercial use of someone’s identity.
Except when referring to New York law, the relevant doctrine will therefore be referred
to as the right of publicity. Unfortunately, the doctrinal confusion does not end with
this distinction between the rights of privacy and publicity. Adding to the confusion
are variations in state common law and statutory rules, a lack of clarity about which
state’s law governs when the interests of multiple states are implicated,25 conflicts
with federal copyright law, 26 and—especially important for present purposes—
variations in how courts reconcile the First Amendment with the right of publicity.27
McCarthy and Schechter describe the right of publicity in terms of regulating
commercial uses of people’s identities, and fairly so, but commercial uses for purposes
of the right of publicity are not limited to what is defined as commercial speech for
purposes of First Amendment doctrine. Commercial speech in the First Amendment
context is often defined as “speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.”28 While this particular definition may be overly narrow and incomplete
even for First Amendment purposes, 29 whatever qualifies as commercial speech
receives less First Amendment protection than non-commercial speech,30 and the right
of publicity, inevitably sweeps up works that constitute non-commercial speech for
First Amendment purposes. Statutory exemptions, state constitutions, and even the
judicial narrowing of statutes prevent some conflicts with the First Amendment,31 but
24 See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 11 (“The right of privacy was and remains the original right
of publicity.”).
25 See 1 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at § 11:7 (“there is little consistency in the case
law”).
26 See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 160-79 (“A Collision Course with Copyright”).
27 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 954 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting)
(“Aside from the confusing development of the right of publicity, and aside from the many differences
associated with the various state statutes in effect, the point of confusion most associated with the
right of publicity law is its interplay with the First Amendment.”); Marshall Leaffer, The Right of
Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALBANY L. REV. 1357, 1363 (2007) (“[T]he courts, in trying
to engraft exceptions to this expanding right [of publicity], have created a disordered and incoherent
body of First Amendment case law.”); ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 145-53.
28 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014).
29 See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (“[C]ommunications can ‘constitute commercial
speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues[.]’ ”); Jordan
v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 515-17 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing commercial speech); Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
30 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980); Bevan & Assocs., LPA v. Yost, No. 183262, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 20201, at *22 (6th Cir. July 8, 2019); Express Oil Change, L.L.C. v. Miss.
Bd. of Licensure for Prof’l Eng’rs & Surveyors, 916 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2019).
31 See, e.g., Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., 812 F.3d 824, 830 n.13
(11th Cir. 2016) (“The protection derived from this provision of the Michigan Constitution provides
the necessary shield for the works at issue and we need not address whether the First Amendment
would also serve to protect the works.”); Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 184 (N.Y.
1984) (“The [New York privacy] statute does not define trade or advertising purposes. However, the
courts have consistently held, from the time of its enactment, that these terms should not be construed
to apply to publications concerning newsworthy events or matters of public interest[.]”; 2 MCCARTHY
& SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at § 8:36 (“One way courts avoid directly facing a constitutional First
Amendment conflict with any tort or property right, including the rights of publicity and privacy, is
to interpret the common law or statute so as to sufficiently narrow it to avoid a head-on collision.”).
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as evidenced by the many cases considering First Amendment defenses to right of
publicity claims, conflicts between the right of publicity and the First Amendment
often occur. 32 When conflicts do occur, courts must consider whether the First
Amendment provides a defense to liability.
Depending on how one counts them, there are four or five different judicial
approaches or tests for reconciling the First Amendment with the right of publicity.33
One approach is not a “test” in the usual sense, meaning an inquiry focused on a
specific question or a list of factors for courts to analyze. This first approach is instead
an ad hoc balancing of the interests involved with a free-ranging discussion of the
various policy considerations.34 Few cases take this approach, however, making any
predictions about outcomes under this approach difficult.
The remaining three to four approaches sound more like typical judicial tests.
First, the “relatedness” test asks whether the use of the plaintiff’s identity is “wholly
unrelated” to the work.35 Put another way, in a version that more closely tracks the
language in Lanham Act false-association cases, this test asks whether the use of the
plaintiff’s identity has artistic relevance to the work or is instead a disguised
advertisement.36 Where the use is artistically relevant, the use is protected by the First
Amendment. This test is generally considered more defendant-friendly.
Second, the predominant purpose test, endorsed by the Missouri Supreme Court,
asks whether the use of a person’s identity is more about making an expressive
comment about the individual or more about “exploit[ing] the commercial value of an
individual’s identity.”37 The Missouri court complained about tests that supposedly
provide First Amendment protection when a work is “in any way expressive” and
preferred “more balanced balancing.” 38 Where the use is predominantly about
expressive comment, the use is (or “could be”) protected by the First Amendment.39
Where the use is more about commercial exploitation, the use is not protected. 40
Compared to the relatedness test, the predominant purpose test is much more plaintifffriendly.
The remaining approach is the transformative use test popularized by the
California Supreme Court in the well-known Comedy III case.41 Professor Rothman
counts the Comedy III test as two different tests because courts apply the Comedy III
32 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th
Cir. 2007) (fantasy baseball games); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (song);
Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881 (Cal. 2003) (comic books); Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (charcoal drawing); Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal.
App. 4th 47 (2006) (video game).
33 See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 145-47.
34 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 823-24; Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972-76 (10th Cir. 1996).
35 See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 47 cmt. c. (1995).
36 This test is often referred to as the Rogers test, named for the Rogers v. Grimaldi case from the
Second Circuit. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). See generally William K.
Ford, Restoring Rogers: Video Games, False Association Claims, and the ‘Explicitly Misleading’ Use of
Trademarks, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306 (2017).
37 See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808-10.
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test in two very different ways, one much more protective of speech than the other.42
The more protective version considers the use of the plaintiff’s identity in the context
of the work as a whole and the extent to which the plaintiff’s identity is part of a larger
work. The less protective version zeroes in on whether the use of the plaintiff’s identity
is realistic. 43 The transformative use test may be plaintiff- or defendant-friendly,
depending on how the court applies it. Considering the work as a whole is clearly better
for defendants because it allows for the realistic use of a plaintiff’s identity within a
transformative context. Focusing on an image of the plaintiff and ignoring the larger
context is clearly better for plaintiffs because it means any realistic image of a plaintiff
potentially triggers liability, regardless of the context of the use.
Comedy III was a case about a charcoal drawing of The Three Stooges by artist
Gary Saderup.44 The defendants sold reproductions of this drawing on T-shirts and
lithographs.45 Comedy III, the entity which controlled the rights to The Three Stooges,
claimed a violation of the deceased Stooges’ rights of publicity. Ultimately, the court
agreed. 46 Yet the court did not view the charcoal drawing on merchandise as
commercial speech.47 Instead, the court said the defendants’ products were expressive
works.48 The defendants argued the products were not within the scope of California’s
right of publicity statute for deceased personalities, 49 but the court disagreed. The
defendants did violate the statute, said the court.50 This conclusion required the court
to determine whether the statute, as applied to the defendants, violated their First
Amendment rights.51
In addressing the constitutional question, the court took inspiration from
copyright’s fair use doctrine and held that First Amendment protection depends on
whether the work at issue is transformative. The question is whether the work
contains “significant transformative elements” beyond the literal depiction of the
celebrities.52 The court added:
Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of
the “raw materials” from which an original work is synthesized, or whether
the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of
the work in question. We ask, in other words, whether a product containing
a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant's own expression rather than the celebrity's likeness. And when

See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 146.
Id.
44 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800.
45 Id. at 800-01.
46 Id. at 811.
47 Id. at 802 (“[T]he present case does not concern commercial speech.”).
48 Id.
49 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2020) (formerly Civil Code § 990). On the renumbering
of the statute in the Civil Code, see Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799 n.1.
50 Id. at 802 (“Saderup thus used the likeness of The Three Stooges ‘on . . . products, merchandise,
or goods’ within the meaning of the statute.”).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 808.
42
43
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we use the word “expression,” we mean expression of something other than
the likeness of the celebrity.53
In close cases, Comedy III said courts should also consider whether the
marketability of a work is tied primarily to the celebrity’s fame or to efforts of the
defendant artist.54
While some authorities disapprove of applying the Comedy III test outside the use
of a person’s likeness and doubt whether the court intended to apply the test to things
other than an image of a person,55 the California Supreme Court provided a range of
examples of works that are transformative, including “factual reporting,” “fictionalized
portrayal[s],” and even a specific example of Rosa Parks’ name used as a song title.56
The court appeared to conceive of the test as an all-purpose one, one that would balance
the First Amendment with the right of publicity in cases generally. Whatever the test
is applied to, the court was clear that a work can be transformative even if the work is
realistic. Again, factual reporting can be transformative, provided the use is something
more than a literal use of a person’s identity with no significant expression added by
the defendant.
In her recent book, Professor Rothman offers some general solutions to the conflict
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Part of her argument is about
how courts should think about the interests at stake and that if they better identify
the interests at stake, they are more likely to get the cases right. 57 She also
recommends supplementing the existing First Amendment tests with further
considerations drawn from copyright law’s fair use analysis and from trademark law’s
nominative fair use analysis.58 Assuming a court starts with a transformative use test,
it is already using one fair use factor drawn from copyright law. There are three
others.59 Trademark law’s nominative fair use analysis adds three more factors using
the Ninth Circuit’s approach, but eleven or more factors using the Second Circuit’s
approach.60 The transformative use analysis, plus three additional copyright fair use
factors, and three, eleven, or more than eleven fair use factors is not likely to make
these cases more predictable or change many outcomes. Many of the First Amendment
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
55 See 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at § 8:72 (“In the authors’ view, the
‘transformative’ test is restricted to the kind of case the court was faced with: an artistic visual
depiction of a celebrity image. While the court mentioned other forms of expression in passing, it did
so only by way of analogy, not by expansion of its rule to other situations. Therefore, in our view, the
‘transformative’ test is strictly limited to visual artistic images which appear in a nonadvertising
context.”); Estate of Fuller v. Maxfield & Oberton Holdings, LLC, 906 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1006 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (“Defendant has not explained, and the Court cannot see, how this test could be applied to an
individual’s name when his image is not also involved.”).
56 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
57 See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 154-59.
58 Id. at 157-59.
59 Id. at 157.
60 See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 168 (2d Cir.
2016) (“Because we believe that the nominative fair use factors will be helpful to a district court’s
analysis, we hold that, in nominative use cases, district courts are to consider the Ninth Circuit and
Third Circuit’s nominative fair use factors, in addition to the [eight] Polaroid factors.”). While the
Ninth and Third Circuits both have three factors, they overlap, which is why the count is eleven or
more.
53
54
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problems described in this article and elsewhere would be solved not by complicating
the rules, but by courts applying the same settled rules in the same way to both
traditional and non-traditional forms of media.
Despite the various points of confusion or disagreement across states and courts,
including the different approaches to reconciling the First Amendment with the right
of publicity (a “disordered and incoherent body of First Amendment case law”61), there
is a sizeable core of predictability in modern right of publicity law, particularly when
dealing with traditional categories of works, such as advertisements, newspapers,
books, magazines, television shows, and films. The chart in the Appendix summarizes
many common situations. While any listed use of a person’s identity could raise a hard
question, such as whether a plaintiff is defining his or her identity too broadly (e.g., a
“Here’s Johnny” scenario), many situations present relatively easy cases with
predictable answers.
The first column mainly consists of commercial speech. Traditional
advertisements constitute commercial speech and are the core situations covered by
the right of publicity. The general rule is that permission is needed to use someone’s
identity in an advertisement to avoid infringement, and the First Amendment won’t
provide a defense to such uses when permission is lacking. The other two categories in
the first column, uses on product packaging and uses for business names, may or may
not represent situations involving commercial speech. After the Supreme Court’s
decision in Matal v. Tam, it’s not clear.62 Cases involving business names are unusual,
but cases involving product packaging should usually be easy to predict. Under current
law permission would be needed, for example, to produce a Mr. T breakfast cereal with
his name and likeness on the box or to place an athlete’s likeness on a box of
Wheaties.63 There can be no real doubt about most of these types of cases.
The third column includes non-commercial, expressive works. For a newspaper or
magazine article, permission is not needed to use someone’s name or likeness.64 The
same applies to biographies.65 As for entertainment, the courts typically reject a rigid
distinction between news and entertainment works for First Amendment purposes.66
Therefore, like newspapers, novels and movies typically do not require permission.67
This generalization does require some caveats, however. What follows are three of
these caveats.
Leaffer, supra note 27, at 1363.
Product packaging and business names can serve as trademarks, but in Tam, the Supreme
Court left open whether trademarks constitute commercial speech. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,
1763-64 (2017) (opinion of Alito, J.); id., at 1767 (opinion of Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
63 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 2020). According to The New York Times, Quaker
Oats’ Mr. T cereal was the first breakfast cereal named for a real individual. See Pamela G. Holli, New
Cereal Pitch to Children, N.Y. TIMES, at D1 (March 27, 1985).
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
65 Id. at § 47 cmt. a. Biographers understand the rule. See, e.g., HOWARD SOUNES, NOTES FROM
THE VELVET UNDERGROUND: THE LIFE OF LOU REED 350 (2015) (“One doesn’t require anyone’s
permission to write biography[.]”).
66 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“The line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of
propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”).
67 See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Leopold v. Levin, 259
N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1970).
61
62
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First, the examples in the right-hand column cover many typical situations, but
when situations arise for which the caselaw is mixed or non-existent, publishers may
justifiably need to proceed with caution. Comic books, for example, have been around
a long time, but historically, comic books have been a less respected medium than
traditional books or films.68 As the cases are mixed, comic book publishers cannot have
the same confidence as traditional book and film publishers that they will be protected
from right of publicity claims.
Three cases illustrate the problem with comic books, one older and two more
recent. In 1950, a New York court held that the publication of a comic book version of
a real-world event was insulated from liability under sections 50 and 51 of the New
York Civil Rights Laws by a public interest exception.69 The story focused on the heroic
exploits of the plaintiff in rescuing people from the Empire State Building after a
United States Army airplane crashed into it, but even with an event of this
significance, the court was divided 3 to 2 on whether the defendant violated the
statute.70 In 2003, the California Supreme Court held that villains in a Jonah Hex
comic book who were inspired by real-world musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter were
sufficiently transformed into the non-human “Autumn” brothers to be protected by the
First Amendment.71 However, the court’s opinion can be read—or misread—to require
significant visual changes to a real person in order to qualify as transformative, which
makes it risky to provide realistic portrayals of real people in comic books.72
Also in 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not
protect the naming of a villain in a comic book after the real-world hockey player Tony
Twist.73 The case involved what is likely the largest judgment in a right of publicity
case. 74 The jury verdict against the defendants was a shocking $24,500,000,75 later
reduced to a still shocking $15,000,000 at a retrial.76 The significance of this case is
complicated by the defendants’ claim that the naming of the character “was not a
parody or other expressive comment or a fictionalized account of the real Twist,” which
led the Missouri Supreme Court to conclude that the only purpose of using Twist’s
name was to appeal to hockey fans.77 If one is a cautious comic book publisher, or a
publisher of some other less traditional form of media, how does one react to cases like
the ones from New York and Missouri? Asking for permission to refer to real people is
a plausible answer.
68 See Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of Publicity, 38
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 166-68 (2015) (discussing comic books); STAN LEE & GEORGE MAIR,
EXCELSIOR: THE AMAZING LIFE OF STAN LEE 56-57 (2002) (describing comic books as being at “the
very bottom of the cultural totem pole” in mid-century America).
69 Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 A.D. 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
70 Id. at 168.
71 Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 892 (Cal. 2003)
72 Although the court mentioned the “larger story” in which the characters appear, much of the
court’s language focused on the visual transformation of the characters: “To the extent the drawings
of the Autumn brothers resemble plaintiffs at all, they are distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody,
or caricature.” Id. at 890. Misreading Jonah Hex involves downplaying the context in which the
characters appear—“the larger story”—and focusing on the fanciful visual changes to the characters.
73 See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373-74 (Mo. 2003).
74 Id. at 374 (Mo. 2003).
75 Id. at 365.
76 See Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
77 Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374. See also Doe, 207 S.W.3d at 60.
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The second caveat is based on New York law. Partially fictional works
incorporating real people can create a problem under New York Civil Rights Law
sections 50 and 51. As the result of a recent state court decision, this problem is no
longer hypothetical or a mere academic digression.78 Dating back to a 1913 case, Binns
v. Vitagraph Company of America,79 and a time when privacy rights were allowed to
interfere with more expression than today,80 the New York Court of Appeals held that
at least some films are within the scope of New York’s privacy statute and can infringe
upon an individual’s privacy rights.81 Binns involved a series of films depicting Jack
Binns, the wireless operator who in 1909 sent the first radio distress signal from a ship
at sea.82 It’s clear from the court’s description that one film recreated the incident at
sea with actors. 83 It’s unclear what exactly the other films included. The court
described one as “essentially a picture of the plaintiff.”84 Like the explanation of the
films, the rule endorsed by the court is not particularly clear, but whatever the rule to
be applied to future cases, the court took a dim view of films produced for amusement
as it found the films in violation of the privacy statute.
While the Binns decision probably reflects hostility to what was then a relatively
new medium of communication—and at a time when notions of free speech were more
constrained—the New York Court of Appeals has never overruled the case. In a 1967
case, the Court of Appeals confronted another expressive work that was not strictly
factual reporting, a biography of Warren Spahn aimed at younger readers. The book
contains imagined dialogue—and lots of it. 85 The book also contains some factual
errors.86 Although the defendants explained the need for some dramatization to appeal
to children, the court found both the author and publisher in violation of New York’s
privacy statute due to the fictional elements and the errors.87 The court suggested that
fictionalized dialogue alone might be sufficient to support liability even without the
errors,88 a holding that would threaten every dramatic recreation of real-world events.
The speech-chilling implications of Binns and Spahn were substantially lessened
by lower state and federal courts interpreting the cases very narrowly or even ignoring
them.89 The New York Court of Appeals itself narrowed Binns and Spahn in 2000, at
See Porco v Lifetime Entertainment Servs., LLC, 147 A.D.3d 1253, 1256 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
103 N.E. 1108, 1109 (N.Y. 1913).
80 See Mark A. Lemley, Privacy, Property, and Publicity, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1153 (2019) (reviewing
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018)),
(“The pre-1954 history of the right of publicity . . . was an outrageous infringement on speech on
matters of public concern.”).
81 Binns, 103 N.E. at 1111 (“We hold that the name and picture of the plaintiff were used by the
defendant as a matter of business and profit and contrary to the prohibition of the statute.”).
82 Id. at 1109.
83 Id. at 1109-10. Some of this footage is included in a PBS documentary on the subject. See
RESCUE AT SEA (WGBH Educational Foundation 1999) (PBS Home Video VHS tape).
84 Binns, 103 N.E. at 1110-11.
85 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842-43 (N.Y. 1967). The work is clearly a
dramatized account of Spahn’s life. Chapter one opens with a battle at the Remagen Bridge in
Germany in 1945 and is filled with exciting dialogue and details that no one would be likely to
remember with such detail. See MILTON J. SHAPIRO, THE WARREN SPAHN STORY 9-14 (1958).
86 Spahn, 233 N.E.2d at 842.
87 Id. at 843.
88 Id. at 843.
89 See Hicks, 464 F.Supp. at 432 (“However, upon closer scrutiny of Spahn, this Court is of the
opinion that the Spahn holding should be and was intended to be limited to its facts[.]”); Molony v.
78
79
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least in cases where a photograph is used to illustrate a newsworthy story, but the
court still did not overrule the cases.90 The court instead reaffirmed them, saying,
“[U]nder Binns and Spahn, an article may be so infected with fiction, dramatization or
embellishment that it cannot be said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness
exception [to the statutory right of privacy].”91 As Binns and Spahn have not been
overruled, it was only a matter of time before a lower court actually followed these
decisions. In 2017, it happened. The New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division
reversed the dismissal of a case involving a television movie about a convicted
murderer, which allegedly contained fictionalized elements.92 Perhaps this case, Porco
v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, will finally force the New York Court of Appeals to
confront the problems created by Binns and Spahn—or perhaps the legislature will
revise the statute first.93
The third caveat is tied to the U.S. Supreme Court’s only decision involving the
right of publicity, the well-known case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Company.94 In Zacchini, the Court considered whether the First Amendment shielded
a news broadcast of Hugo Zacchini’s human cannonball act from a right of publicity
claim where the station, at least according to the majority, broadcast Zacchini’s “entire
act.” The case was unusual because it involved a news report and because the Court
said the First Amendment did not provide a defense.95
Despite some overbroad language in Zacchini, a general principle of the case is
that the First Amendment will not protect a use of person’s identity that, if allowed,
would undermine or destroy the incentive for the person to perform his or her job in
the first place. The Court said, “Wherever the line in particular situations is to be
drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when
they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”96 Whether this actually
occurred in Zacchini is questionable,97 but a modern application of the principle would
be digitally inserting living actors into new roles without their consent. A real-world
actor with popular appeal could be inserted into roles to avoid paying the actor, thus

Boy Comics Publishers, 277 A.D. 166, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (“In the Binns case it was stated that
the statute is penal and should be strictly construed. Since its decision in 1913, it has been
distinguished frequently, and confined to its particular facts[.]”). See also 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER,
supra note 15, at § 8:77 (“[A]fter the Spahn decision in 1967, most of the lower courts upheld the
immunity of docudramas and unauthorized biographies from liability under the New York statute.
They did this by either ignoring or distinguishing the Binns-Spahn cases.”). Last year, in a case to be
discussed below, the New York Court of Appeals helpfully lists many of the cases that have declined
to follow its earlier rulings and did so without any hint of disapproval. See Lohan v. Take-Two
Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 389, 393 (N.Y. 2018).
90 Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 555 (N.Y. 2000).
91 Id.
92 Porco v Lifetime Entertainment Servs., LLC, 147 A.D.3d 1253, 1256 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
93 For recent efforts to reform sections 50 and 51 of New York’s Civil Rights Law, see Assembly
Bill No. A05605, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (“AN ACT to amend the civil rights law and the
arts and cultural affairs law, in relation to the right of privacy and the right of publicity”); Senate
Bill No. S05959, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess (N.Y. 2019) (same).
94 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
95 Id. at 563-65.
96 Id. at 574-75.
97 See id. at 579 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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undermining the pursuit of an acting career in the first place.98 A documentary about
the history of Hollywood might have a fair reason to digitally recreate some individuals
as themselves, 99 but the situation looks closer to the concern in Zacchini when
individuals are being used to play other characters.100
Despite these caveats, many common situations involving the use of real people’s
identities in expressive works involve relatively easy cases. Uses in newspapers,
magazine articles, books, documentaries, docudramas, and television shows generally
present straightforward questions with predictable answers. Assuming no other
common law or statutory exemption protects an expressive work from a right of
publicity claim, uses in these contexts are generally protected by the First Amendment.
In 2013, for example, the Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute for Self Development
sued Target for selling seven unauthorized biographies and a made-for-television
movie about Rosa Parks. 101 The issues were not difficult. The Institute lost in the
district court on summary judgment and then lost again on appeal.102 All four federal
judges therefore agreed and reached the expected result. The only interesting question
is why the Institute pursued these claims in the first place.103
But what about games? Games are missing from the chart in the Appendix. The
answer for games once was clear and predictable: games are merchandise; they belong
in the middle column; and therefore, permission is generally required to use a real
person in a game.104 Expectations and industry practice might well have varied for the
use of a person’s name on a trivia game card, a use of a politician or military figure in
a game, or a use in a game for purposes of parody. Courts might very well have found
these uses protected on some basis had the issue arisen,105 but the general rule was
that permission was needed to use someone’s identity in a game.

See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 175-77; Ford & Liebler, supra note 7, at 97.
As indicated in the chart in the Appendix, pornography already raises difficult questions in
right of publicity cases. The problems posed by “deepfakes” and pornography are beyond the scope of
the present discussion, but deepfakes do raise serious questions about where the lines should be
drawn for the freedom to digitally recreate people. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128
YALE L.J. 1870, 1921-24 (2019). As with less intrusive digital recreations of people, a resolution of the
deepfake problem should not depend on whether a film or a game is involved.
100 See Ford & Liebler, supra note 7, at 97.
101 See Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., 812 F.3d 824, 826-27, 832 (11th
Cir. 2016). The case also involved a plaque, which involved a harder question, but the court found that
the plaque was also protected by a “qualified privileged” under the Michigan state constitution “to
communicate on matters of public interest.” Id. at 830-32.
102 Id. at 832.
103 Perhaps the Institute was emboldened by a questionable 2003 decision involving an
unauthorized song named after Rosa Parks. In response to a motion for summary judgment, the
district court ruled that the First Amendment provided a defense to Parks’ Lanham Act and right of
publicity claims. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that the First Amendment defense could not be
resolved as a matter of law. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2003).
104 See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at § 7:26; Ford & Liebler, supra note 7,
at 21-36.
105 During the closing argument of Michael’s Jordan case against Dominick’s grocery store for its
unauthorized use of Michael Jordan’s identity in an advertisement, Jordan’s attorney compared the
advertising use to Jordan’s name being used in a trivia game. He said to the jury, “It’s an answer to a
trivia game. You don’t have to pay anything actually to use it.” Interestingly, the game’s publisher
still paid Jordan $5,000. Trial Transcript, Jordan v. Dominick’s Finer Food, LLC., No. 10-C-00407, at
803-05 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2015). See also Trial Transcript, Jordan v. Dominick’s Finer Food, LLC., No.
98
99

[19:178 2020]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property

190

This general rule was established in three cases from 1967, 1970, and 1973. The
first two cases both involved sports simulation board games. In 1967, Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc. involved a board game called Pro-Am Golf.106 In 1970,
Uhlaender v. Henricksen involved a pair of baseball board games called Negamco’s
Major League Baseball and Big League Manager Baseball.107 The games simulated golf
and baseball by providing various custom statistics for the athletes, dice or spinners,
and rules for resolving either a game of golf or a game of baseball.108 In 1973, a third
case involved a game using Howard Hughes’ name and various biographical facts
about him.109 All three of these cases reached the same conclusion. The courts said
games were a form of merchandise and unlike, say, a biography, the manufacturers of
the games needed to obtain permission to use the names of real people.110
The gaming medium has come a long way since 1973, and video games are a major
part of the medium’s evolution. Despite the earlier decisions involving games, in 2007
the Eighth Circuit’s C.B.C. decision recognized First Amendment protection for
fantasy baseball.111 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown described video games
as comparable to books and films. Are games still stuck in the middle of the chart after

10-C-00407, at 509-512 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2015) (cross examination involving the use of Jordan’s
identity in the trivia game).
106 232 A.2d 458, 459 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).
107 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). Strat-O-Matic Baseball is probably the better-known
example of the games in this genre, though its heyday passed long ago. See GLENN GUZZO, STRAT-OMATIC FANATICS: THE UNLIKELY SUCCESS STORY OF A GAME THAT BECAME AN AMERICAN PASSION
(2005).
108 Pro-Am Golf (1966) is the more obscure game of the three. In a previous article a co-author
and I discussed the game based on the court’s opinion, but a copy of the game was not available to us
at the time. See Ford & Liebler, supra note 7, at 22-26. Indeed, there was nothing online about the
game other than what could be found in the court’s opinion. After publishing that article, one copy of
the game appeared on eBay in 2014, which I purchased. Nothing in the box changes any conclusions
in the previous article, but some courts have reported the game used the pictures or likenesses of the
various real golfers included in the game. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1086 (D. Mo. 2006), aff’d 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. Mo., Oct.
16, 2007); Parks v. Laface Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 n.3 (D. Minn. 1999), rev’d 329 F.3d 437
(6th Cir. 2003). This is not accurate. The game used only the names and biographical data of the
professional and celebrity golfers. (Among the 23 player profiles included were ones for celebrity
golfers Bob Hope, Bing Crosby, and Jackie Gleason.) For a demonstration of how the game works, see
Games Are Not Coffee Mugs, Ep. 4, UIC JOHN MARSHALL (July 17, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lcDqR4Wqeg.
109 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
110 See Palmer, 232 A.2d at 79 (“It would therefore seem, from a review of the authorities, that
although the publication of biographical data of a well-known figure does not per se constitute an
invasion of privacy, the use of that same data for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using
it in connection with a commercial project other than the dissemination of news or articles or
biographies does.”); Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1283 (“Defendants have violated plaintiffs’ rights by
the unauthorized appropriation of their names and statistics for commercial use.”); Rosemont, 72 Misc.
at 791 (“In reality, defendants are not disseminating news. They are not educating the public as to
the achievements of Howard Hughes. They are selling a commodity, a commercial product, an
entertaining game of chance, the outcome of which is determined by maneuvering tokens on a game
board by the throw of the dice. The use of plaintiff’s name, biographical data etc. in this context is not
legitimate to the public interest. It is merely the medium used to market a commodity familiar to us
all in its varied types and forms.”).
111 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
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these decisions? Since Brown there have been seven notable decisions involving video
games and the right of publicity. The table below lists them in chronological order.
Post-Brown Right of Publicity/Privacy Video Game Decisions
Defendant
Prevailed?

Case

Court

Year

Game(s)

Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.112

Third Circuit

2013

NCAA Football
(series)

No

Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc.113

Ninth Circuit

2013

NCAA Football
and NCAA
Basketball
(series)

No

Noriega v.
Activision/Blizzard,
Inc.114

Cal. Superior
Court

2014

Call of Duty:
Black Ops II

Yes

Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc.115

Ninth Circuit

2015

Madden NFL
(series)

No

Lohan v. Take-Two
Interactive Software,
Inc.116

N.Y. Court of
Appeals

2018

Grand Theft
Auto V

Yes

Gravano v. Take-Two
Interactive Software,
Inc.117

N.Y. Court of
Appeals

2018

Grand Theft
Auto V

Yes

Hamilton v. Speight118

E.D. Pa.

2019

Gears of War
(series)

Yes

There is, however, one earlier decision involving video games that is particularly
important for understanding these cases. That case is No Doubt v. Activision
Publishing, Inc.,119 which was decided by the Court of Appeal of California a little over
four months before Brown. In No Doubt the court held that the First Amendment does
not protect the use of the band No Doubt in Activision’s Band Hero video game.120 Band
Hero is a musical simulation game. As can be seen in the Appendix, the rules applicable
to musical recreations in other forms of media can vary, especially when the recreation
717 F.3d 141.
724 F.3d 1268.
114 No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149.
115 775 F.3d 1172. The court focused its discussion on the NCAA Football games but the court’s
holding and discussion applies to the NCAA Basketball games as well. Id. at 1272 n.2.
116 97 N.E.3d 389.
117 31 N.Y.3d 988.
118 No. 2:17-cv-169, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165113, 2019 WL 4697485 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2019),
appeal docketed, No. 19-3495 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2019).
119 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011).
120 Id. at 1022.
112
113
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is not contained within a broader narrative.121 In No Doubt, the Court of Appeal of
California was bound by the California Supreme Court’s decision in Comedy III. The
court of appeal therefore applied the transformative use test.
In applying the transformative use test, the court acknowledged that realistic
portrayals of an individual could be transformative. 122 Context matters, said the
court.123 In Band Hero the context included placing No Doubt in fanciful venues and
the ability to have No Doubt perform songs from other artists.124 Yet the court still
held that Activision’s use was not transformative because the various contextual
features of the game did “not transform the avatars into anything other than exact
depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as celebrities.”125 Context
matters, except when it doesn’t. The court treated the transformative test as one that
requires some visual change to the portrayal of the plaintiffs, focusing on the avatars
in the game rather than the game as a whole. The court also said Activision wanted to
appeal to No Doubt’s fan base, 126 which was surely true. How would this analysis
square with the treatment of a documentary or a biography about No Doubt? Such
works would strive to be realistic and both would be published to appeal mostly to fans
of No Doubt, perhaps even more so than a game featuring a variety of music. Why are
games different than documentaries or biographies? Or why is Band Hero in particular
different? Realism can’t be the explanation. The fact that the case was about a game
could be.
The Third and Ninth Circuits’ decisions in Hart and Keller relied upon No Doubt
in deciding similar cases involving video games, but rather than musical simulations,
Hart and Keller involved college sports simulations. The plaintiffs in both putative
class actions were college athletes who objected to the use of their identities in the
games as members of the teams represented in the games.127 Although the plaintiffs’
names were not included in the off-the-shelf versions of the games, the games included
assorted biographical and career information about the players, which would identify
each avatar’s real-world counterpart. 128 Consumers could also download rosters to
name the player avatars.129 Both courts of appeals accepted the transformative use
test as the correct way to balance the right of publicity with the First Amendment, but
in a baffling statement the Ninth Circuit described itself as bound by Comedy III’s
transformative use test and considered No Doubt a persuasive application of the
test.130 Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit was free to follow the California state
courts if it found the Comedy III and No Doubt decisions persuasive interpretations of
the First Amendment, but no federal court is bound by a state supreme court’s
interpretation of the First Amendment.131
Compare infra notes 13 and 18 in the Appendix.
192 Cal. App. 4th at 1033-34.
123 Id. at 1034.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1035.
127 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272; Hart, 717 F.3d at 145-46.
128 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272; Hart, 717 F.3d at 145-47.
129 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272; Hart, 808 F. Supp. at 761, 764.
130 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273-79; Hart, 717 F.3d at 158-70.
131 It’s true that “[w]hen interpreting state law, a federal court is bound by the decision of the
highest state court.” In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1990). But the transformative use
test was not a matter of state law in Comedy III. It was not something the California Supreme Court
121
122
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In following Comedy III, as applied in No Doubt, both courts focused on the
realistic portrayal of the college athletes in the games. In Comedy III, there was no
larger context in which The Three Stooges appeared, but in Hart and Keller there was
an elaborate game and environment surrounding each avatar. Any recognition of the
larger context in which the avatars appeared, however, was overcome by the same
analysis as the court’s analysis in No Doubt: the players were realistically portrayed
doing what they did in the real world when playing for their college teams.132
Both decisions generated a dissent. Judge Ambro’s dissent in Hart was the
clearest in trying to apply uniform rules to different forms of media, including
“biographies, documentaries, docudramas, and other expressive works depicting reallife figures, whether the accounts are factual or fictional.” 133 Ambro’s dissent
recognizes that the inquiry into the transformative use of a person’s identity can’t focus
solely on the realism of the likeness, but must depend on the larger context in which a
likeness or other indicator of identity appears.134 Ambro therefore focused on the many
creative elements of the games to assess whether they were transformative. 135
Similarly, Judge Sidney Thomas’ dissent in Keller mentioned the need to evaluate the
“proper holistic context” in which the plaintiff’s identity appears,136 but his dissent is
somewhat mixed. On the one hand, he emphasized the relative anonymity of any given
avatar in the NCAA Football games and contrasted this fact with the much greater
prominence of No Doubt in the Band Hero game. 137 It’s unclear how this sort of
approach would apply to a biography or typical documentary. Few biographies or
documentaries focus on no one in particular. On the other hand, Thomas said he fully
agreed with Ambro’s dissent in Hart.138 Both dissenters endorsed treating the various
forms of expressive works consistently, even though at least some of Thomas’
discussion raises questions about how to do this.

grafted onto a state statute as a construction of the statute. The California Supreme Court made clear
that Saderup was liable under the statute unless the First Amendment independently prevented the
application of the statute and offered the transformative use test as the way to determine if the First
Amendment does so. The transformative use test was therefore an interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution, not state law. Federal courts are not bound by state interpretations of federal law or the
U.S. Constitution. See Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir.
1984) (“Of course, the state court’s interpretation of federal law does not bind our decision, though it
may persuade us to reach a similar result.”); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1097 (9th Cir.
1980) (“Although a state court’s determination of state law binds the federal courts, interpretation of
the federal constitution cannot be circumscribed by state definitions.”). See also Industrial
Consultants v. H. S. Equities, 646 F.2d 746, 749 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The district court was not bound to
adopt the Oklahoma [Supreme] [C]ourt’s interpretation of federal constitutional principles, even as
applied to Oklahoma statutes.”); Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164, 1171 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“[W]e are not bound by state court determinations on federal constitutional issues[.]”). The Supreme
Court’s decision in Zacchini is also on point. It shows that federal courts are not bound when a state’s
highest court interprets federal law in the application of a state statute. See Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1977).
132 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276; Hart, 717 F.3d at 168.
133 Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 173.
135 Id. at 174-75.
136 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1286 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
137 Id. at 1288.
138 Id. at 1285 n.2.
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As a consequence of Hart and Keller, permission is needed from every one of
thousands of players portrayed in these games, despite the incidental role of most
players. Applying the same rule to a biography would mean not just the subject matter
of the biography (the person’s whose name is in the title) would have to grant
permission, but so would everyone else who is named in the book. Group licensing
agreements can facilitate obtaining permission from a league’s worth of professional
athletes, but there is no group licensing agreement for “people who have interacted
with X,” where X is some celebrity, politician, scientist, business person, or anyone else
that might be the subject of a biography. Even if permission could be obtained from
the subject matter of a biography and everyone else who is to be named, the ability to
grant permission creates the ability to control or influence what an author says, thus
limiting the candor of the biographer. Such a rule would be the end of unauthorized
biographies and documentaries, assuming courts actually applied this rule to these
works, which they don’t.
When the Ninth Circuit decided the Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc. case in 2015, it
was largely a replay of Keller, but with retired professional football players portrayed
in the Madden NFL series of video games rather than college athletes.139 Unlike active
professional players, these retired players were not part of a group licensing deal, and
they did not give their permission to be portrayed in the games.140 As in Keller, these
non-consenting retired players were not named in the games, but the players were
identifiable due to the biographical and career data included in the game.141 Davis
included a revealing exchange during the oral argument where one judge on the panel
dismissed the expressive value of video games, comparing them unfavorably to the
typical greeting card. 142 Davis followed the prior panel’s lead in Keller, as it was
supposed to,143 and also briefly considered and rejected Electronic Arts’ alternative
defenses not previously resolved in Keller. In Davis, none of the judges suggested any
skepticism about Keller, but the case was routine in a sense, given Keller’s status as
circuit precedent.
The majorities in Hart and Keller did not admit they were applying different rules
to video games than they would apply to other forms of media, but the majorities could
offer little more than simple denials. 144 Davis, as a straightforward application of
Keller, did not even try to address this question. In a recent article, Professor Michael
Park suggests the following reason for the disparate treatment of video games in these
cases:

Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1175.
141 Id. at 1175-76.
142 Oral Argument at 00:09:33, Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 12-15737 (9th Cir. Sept. 11,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hlz3cx6IWQ. See also Ford (2017), supra note 36, at 31011 (discussing this part of the oral argument).
143 See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing when a threejudge panel in the Ninth Circuit is bound by prior three-judge panel decisions).
144 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 n. 10; Hart, 717 F.3d at 165. Footnote 10 in Keller was the
majority’s response to the dissenting judge’s claim about the effect Keller would have on other forms
of media that feature realistic depictions of individuals. It’s difficult to figure out what footnote 10 is
supposed to mean. The majority said other realistic works are not necessarily in jeopardy. Electronic
Arts, however, had a “primary emphasis on reproducing reality.” Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 n. 10.
Documentaries would not be protected by the First Amendment from right of publicity claims?
139
140
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Nothing evinces more complete relinquishment or appropriation of one’s
identity by another than for a user to control an avatar. As a right historically
rooted in the right to privacy—‘the right to be let alone’—an argument can be
made that the embodiment of an avatar simulacrum, and the control afforded
to users in interactive games, overly infringes on an individual’s right to
control how their identity is used and represented.145
Courts do not offer this rationale as the reason for the disparate treatment (instead,
they deny that there is any disparate treatment), but more fundamentally, it’s not clear
why this would be true. Consider Ryan Hart, the Rutgers quarterback and named
plaintiff in the Hart case. Why would it represent more of a relinquishment of Hart’s
identity to be portrayed as an avatar in a football game than to be portrayed in a biopic
or docudrama? Any given user of NCAA Football can make a limited range of choices
for any particular avatar, all confined to playing football. In a hypothetical docudrama
about Rutgers football or about Hart in particular, the viewers may be passive “users”
of the work who don’t make any choices about how the work proceeds, but the writer
or writers would put words into Hart’s mouth and an actor would bring these words to
life and choose how to deliver the lines, the tone to use, and the facial expressions to
make. Wouldn’t this type of work be the greater appropriation, especially if the
docudrama focused on Hart in particular? Yet the docudrama would be protected by
the First Amendment (except, perhaps, in a New York state court, as noted earlier).
Writers and actors could of course do similar things in a video game as a docudrama,
provided someone produced a more narrative style video game about Rutgers football
instead of a football simulation. Thus, it’s not really clear why the game element makes
any difference in terms of the appropriation of one’s identity.
The more plausible explanation for the differential treatment of games, as
illustrated by the oral argument comment in Davis, is that games simply don’t receive
the same level of respect as other forms of media. Traditionally, games are
merchandise or commodities subject to the same treatment as celebrity coffee mugs.
Many judges likely have limited experience with video games. Moreover, sports
simulations lack close analogues to cases involving other forms of media. Unlike
docudramas which often use real people without permission, what would it even mean
for real-world baseball or football games to include real people in the games without
permission? There are films about sports figures that recreate bits and pieces of
sporting events, but these scenes are likely to be contained within a larger narrative.146
Nevertheless, Hart and Keller were still close cases. But what if the case involves a
game that seems more like a film or television show?
The two New York cases listed above were both victories for the video game
defendants, but only marginally so. Unlike Hart, Keller, and Davis, both cases involved
Grand Theft Auto V, which is not a music or sports simulation game. Instead, it has
stories with plots and dialogue. The plaintiffs were actress Lindsay Lohan in one

145 Michael K. Park, The Medium is the Message: Digital Aesthetics and Publicity Interests in
Interactive Entertainment Media, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1166, 1195 (2018).
146 See, e.g., 42 (Warner Bros. 2013) (Jackie Robinson); THE BABE (Universal Pictures 1992) (Babe
Ruth).
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case147 and reality show star Karen Gravano in the other.148 In the Lohan case, Lohan
referred to three alleged uses of her identity in the game, and it was at least plausible
to view one of them (a character named Lacey Jonas) as a parody of the real-world
Lohan.149 In the Gravano case, Gravano’s alleged appearance in the game was clearly
a parody of the plaintiff as the similarities between Gravano and a video game
character named Andrea Bottino could not have been coincidental.150 The real-world
Gravano’s father is named Sammy and is a Gambino family mobster.151 The fictional
Bottino’s father is named Sammy and is a Gambetti family mobster.152 Gravano was
on a reality show called “Mob Wives.”153 Bottino was on a fictional show called “Wise
Bitches.” 154 Gravano and Bottino both moved out West for safety. 155 This case
presented an opportunity to revisit Binns and Spahn and to address the status of video
games under New York’s right of privacy. It would have been of some note if the New
York Court of Appeals had ruled that video game producers are as free to construct
parodies of real people as, say, the producers of South Park. The court did neither of
these things. Instead, the court in both cases said the video game characters were not
recognizable as the plaintiffs. 156 In Lohan, the court said, “[T]he ambiguous
representations in question are nothing more than cultural comment that is not
recognizable as [Lohan].”157 In Gravano, the court said, “[Gravano] is not recognizable
from the images at issue here.” 158 By holding that neither game actually used the
plaintiffs’ likenesses, the court avoided the interesting questions.159
This leaves the two cases, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc,160 and Hamilton v.
Speight. 161 Of these two, Hamilton is less interesting for present purposes. In
Hamilton, the plaintiff, Lenwood Hamilton, claimed the publishers of the Gears of War
video game series used his professional wrestling identity as Hard Rock Hamilton in
the creation of a character named Augustus “Cole Train” Cole.162 The District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania said there were some similarities between
Hamilton and Cole in terms of appearance and voice,163 but the Gears of War games
had nothing to do with wrestling or even Earth. The Cole character was a former player
of a fictional sport called “thrashball” who became a soldier, not a former or current
Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 389, 395-96 (N.Y. 2018).
Gravano v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 396, 397 (N.Y. 2018).
149 Lohan, 97 N.E.3d at 392.
150 See Verified Amended Complaint, Gravano v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc, No.
151633/2014, at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 28, 2014).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Lohan, 97 N.E.3d at 395-96; Gravano, 97 N.E.3d at 397.
157 Lohan, 97 N.E.3d at 395.
158 Gravano, 97 N.E.3d at 397.
159 See Lohan, 97 N.E.3d at 396 (declining to address any other arguments because the character
in the game is not recognizable as Lohan).
160 No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014).
161 No. 2:17-cv-169, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165113 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2019), appeal docketed, No.
19-3495 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2019).
162 Id. at *2, 19.
163 Id. at *6 (“Cole and Hamilton share broadly similar faces, hair styles, races, skin tones, and
large, muscular body builds. Cole’s and Hamilton’s voices also sound similar.”).
147
148

[19:178 2020]

So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?

197

wrestler. 164 Applying the transformative use test as required by Third Circuit
precedent in Hart,165 the court found any use of Hamilton’s identity in the games to be
quite transformative in terms of appearance, biography, and personality.166 The court
described the larger context of the use in Hamilton as “profoundly transformative,”
involving an “extraordinarily fanciful situation” on a fictional planet in a fictional
war.167 The use was therefore protected by the First Amendment. 168 As any use of
Hamilton’s identity was no more than “one of the ‘raw materials’ from which the Cole
character was synthesized” before being placed in a highly fanciful game,169 the case
was similar to a pre-Brown California state court decision from 2006 and reached the
same result as the state court. 170 Hamilton did not involve the portrayal of a real
person doing something like what the person does or did in the real world. Hamilton
was not like the Noriega case.
In one important way, the most interesting of the seven post-Brown cases involves
Manuel Noriega’s unlicensed appearance in Call of Duty: Black Ops II. The case is
Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc,171 which was decided by the Superior Court of
California. Like Grand Theft Auto V, Call of Duty: Black Ops II is not a music or sports
simulation game. It is instead a military-style first-person shooter game. It also
features a campaign mode with a narrative storyline and various characters. Realworld people appear in the game, such as Oliver North who participated in the making
of the game by recording dialogue.172 Former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega
also appeared in the game, but he did not participate in the making of the game nor
did he authorize his appearance in it.173 One of the missions (“Time and Fate”) takes
place in Panama in 1986 with Noriega as the President of Panama assisting the CIA.174
Another mission (“Suffer With Me”) takes place in 1989 with a goal of capturing
Noriega.175
Although the storylines are fiction, Noriega is portrayed realistically. His likeness
is realistic. Under No Doubt, his case against Activision/Blizzard seemed compelling.
Yet the court held:
[D]efendants’ use of Noriega’s likeness was transformative. The publicly
available photographs of Noriega used to create his avatar were part of the
extensive “raw materials” from which the game was synthesized. Noriega's
depiction was not the “very sum and substance” of the work. The complex and
Id. at *5-6
Id. at *10.
166 Id. at *19.
167 Id. at *24-26.
168 Id. at *26.
169 Id. at *18.
170 The California case is the well-known case of Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th
47 (2006), and the district court in Hamilton discussed and relied upon it as an application of the
transformative use test. See Hamilton, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165113, at *14-15, 21.
171 No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014).
172 See Larry Frum, Review: ‘Call of Duty: Black Ops II’ is Disjointed But Compelling, CNN (Nov.
16, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/11/16/tech/gaming-gadgets/call-of-duty-review/index.html.
173 See Complaint, Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No BC 551747, at 2 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 15,
2014).
174 See Call of Duty: Black Ops II 52-59 (2012) (BradyGames Signature Series Guide).
175 Id. at 82-89.
164
165
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multi-faceted game is a product of defendants’ own expression, with de
minimis use of Noriega's likeness. Because the video game is tranformative
[sic], economic considerations are not relevant. Regardless, the Court
concludes that the marketability and economic value of the challenged work
in this case comes not from Noriega, but from the creativity, skill and
reputation of defendants.176
Although a use should not have to be de minimis to qualify for First Amendment
protection, the focus on the game as a whole sounds quite compelling and consistent
with Comedy III. However, it’s not consistent with No Doubt. Interestingly, the court
explicitly rejected any reliance on Keller, because Keller would require ignoring the
video game as a whole and require instead focusing on just the Noriega character—but
this was also true of No Doubt.177 Noriega appears to be the case that finally gives
video games their due and treats them like a court would treat a book or film.
Admittedly, it’s unclear if the trial court judge was truly sympathetic to the First
Amendment interests of the video game medium or simply unsympathetic to the
infamous plaintiff. Had the court gone the other way in Noriega, it could have easily
explained the outcome as consistent with No Doubt, Hart, and Keller, but how would
the court have explained the outcome as consistent with cases involving other forms of
media? In any event, Noriega is an unreported trial court order, which is not binding
on other courts,178 and it is not likely to have the same persuasive influence as No
Doubt.
Dissenting in Keller, Judge Thomas worried that “[t]he logical consequence of the
majority view is that all realistic depictions of actual persons, no matter how
incidental, are protected by a state law right of publicity regardless of the creative
context. This logic jeopardizes the creative use of historic figures in motion pictures,
books, and sound recordings.”179 He was right about the logical consequences, but of
course, the logical consequences need not control in other cases. The assortment of
cases involving video games has not and probably will not affect cases involving
traditional forms of media. Despite the narrow focus on realism as the touchstone of
liability in No Doubt, Keller, and Davis, recent decisions from these same courts
involving films yield the expected results, not the result that follows from the video
game cases.180 The results in these recent cases are the same ones that would have
been expected if none of the video game cases had ever been decided.

Noriega, No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at 4.
Id. at *4 n. 4.
178 See, e.g., Bolanos v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 4th 744, 761 (2008) (“[A] written trial court
ruling has no precedential value.”); In re Molz, 127 Cal. App. 4th 836, 845 (2005) (“These trial court
decisions, of course, have no precedential authority.”).
179 Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
180 See Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016) (film entitled The Hurt Locker); De
Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 21 Cal. App. 5th 845 (2018) (television miniseries entitled Feud: Bette
and Joan). See also Brown v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 418, 437-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(following California state court and Ninth Circuit decisions in a case about a documentary entitled
Whitney: Can I Be Me).
176
177
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III. CONCLUSION
A more nuanced or more complex First Amendment test is not needed to reconcile
the cases involving games with the cases involving other forms of media. To reduce
uncertainty and to avoid chilling speech, a simpler test is preferable over a more
complex one. Either the relatedness test or the transformative use test could be this
simple test. Where the transformative use test has run into problems is when courts
have applied it to less traditional forms of media—mainly games—but when courts
confront games that appear more analogous to the films they routinely protect, courts
are likely to reach outcomes like the one in the Noriega case. The opinions in Hart and
Keller contain no serious response to the claim that they were applying a “mediumspecific metric” to video games, but at least these courts were doing what was
traditionally done with sports simulation games, and in Davis, the court was “simply”
following circuit precedent. The New York cases avoided the problem of reconciling the
right of privacy with the First Amendment by finding no recognizable uses of the
plaintiffs’ likenesses in the games. The problem cannot be avoided in cases like Noriega
where a plaintiff is clearly identified by name. When cases like Noriega finally arise in
the appellate courts, with the use of identifiable (and non-notorious) individuals in
games with the look and feel of narrative films (as opposed to sports simulations), it
will become untenable to disfavor games relative to traditional forms of media. To
remain consistent with the Supreme Court’s position on games in Brown, the lower
courts will finally have to stop treating games like coffee mugs.
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IV. APPENDIX

The Right of Publicity/Privacy
Advertising and
Other Uses
for Purposes of
Trade

Merchandise and
Other Uses
for Purposes of
Trade

Expressive
Works

Commercial
Speech(?)1

Non-Commercial
Speech(?)2

Non-Commercial
Speech

*Permission
ordinarily needed*

*Permission
ordinarily needed*

*Permission
ordinarily NOT needed*

Traditional Ads3
Product Packaging4
Business Names5

Merchandise6
Coffee Mugs7
Plastic Busts8
Posters9
Trading Cards10
T-shirts11
Other (Debatable) Uses
Pornography12
Musical Tributes (?)13
Fictionalized History
(N.Y. law) (?)14

Traditional Media
News Reporting15
Biographies16
Novels17
Plays/Musicals18
Television Programs/Films
(including fictionalized
works and docudramas)19
Less Traditional Media
Comic Books(?)20
Merchandise
Political Merchandise21
Transformative
Merchandise22
Limitation: Zacchini23

1 See Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 648 (2014) (discussing the difference between commercial
and non-commercial speech); Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 515-17 (7th Cir. 2014)
(same); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1016-18 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). Insofar as product
packaging and business names are used as trademarks (including the related category of trade dress),
it is not clear whether these uses would constitute commercial speech. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 204 L.
Ed. 2d 714, 726 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court has not
decided whether the trademark statute is simply a method of regulating pure ‘commercial speech.’ ”).
2 See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001) (“But the
present case does not concern commercial speech. As the trial court found, Saderup’s portraits of The
Three Stooges are expressive works and not an advertisement for or endorsement of a product.”).

[19:178 2020]

So Are Games Coffee Mugs or What?

201

3 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 2020); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(1) (Deering 2020);
765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/5 (2019) (“Commercial purpose”); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (2020);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. a (1995).
4 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products . . . or goods . . . without such
person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured
as a result thereof.”).
5 See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994) (restaurant called “Spanky McFarland’s”).
6 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 2020) (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in . . . merchandise . . . without
such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons
injured as a result thereof.”).
7 See Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (“To
maintain a cause of action for a violation of [Florida statute] section 540.08, a plaintiff must allege
that his or her name or likeness is used to directly promote a commercial product or service, such as
T-shirts, hats, coffee mugs, etc.”) (emphasis added).
8 See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc., v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d
697 (Ga. 1982) (plastic bust of Martin Luther King, Jr.).
9 See, e.g., Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (poster of Christie
Brinkley).
10 See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953)
(baseball cards). But see Aldrin v. Topps Co., No. 10-9939, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110800 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 2011) (granting the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion where the defendant used the plaintiff’s
name (and likeness?) in a trading card set entitled ‘Topps American Heritage: American Heroes
Edition’). Cf. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that parody trading cards are protected by the First Amendment).
11 See, e.g., Ohio State Univ. v. Skreened Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 3d 905, 915-17 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (Tshirts with the name and likeness of football coach Urban Meyer); Bruce Lee Enters., LLC v.
A.V.E.L.A., Inc., No., 10-2333, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31155, at *53-56 (S.D.N.Y. March 6, 2013) (Tshirts with the likeness of Bruce Lee).
12 See Toffoloni v. LFB Publ’g Group, 572 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We hold that these
photographs do not qualify for the newsworthiness exception to the right of publicity.”); Geary v.
Goldstein, 831 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that there was “a factual dispute over
whether the adaptation [of a real television commercial into a pornographic version] falls within the
public interest exception” to New York’s right of privacy); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 72627 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting a preliminary injunction over an illustration in Playgirl magazine of “a
nude black man seated in the corner of a boxing ring” captioned “Mystery Man” and referred to as
“the Greatest”). A decision involving the unauthorized use of the plaintiffs on the cover of an erotic
book entitled A Gronking to Remember is plausibly explained as a case in this category. See Roe v.
Amazon.com, No. 15-0111, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33297, at *1-16 (S.D. Ohio March 15, 2016) (denying
a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the author of the book). But see Balsley v. LFP, Inc.,
No. 1:08-CV-491, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152034, at *2-3, 28 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2010) (photograph
published in Hustler magazine did not violate the plaintiff’s right of publicity).
13 Compare Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (“[W]e confront
the question of whether the use of the likeness of a famous deceased entertainer in a performance
mainly designed to imitate that famous entertainer’s own past stage performances is to be considered
primarily as a commercial appropriation by the imitator or show’s producer of the famous entertainer’s
likeness or as a valuable contribution of information or culture. [W]e have decided that although THE
BIG EL SHOW contains an informational and entertainment element, the show serves primarily to
commercially exploit the likeness of Elvis Presley without contributing anything of substantial value
to society.”), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.790(2), (2)(b) (2019) (“Any commercial use by another of the
name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness of a person requires the written consent of that person
or his or her successor in interest unless: . . . (b) The use is an attempt to portray, imitate, simulate
or impersonate a person in a live performance[.]”).
14 Compare Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 555 (N.Y. 2000)
(“Binns and Spahn concerned a strikingly different scenario from the one before us. In those cases,
defendants invented biographies of plaintiffs’ lives. The courts concluded that the substantially
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fictional works at issue were nothing more than attempts to trade on the persona of Warren Spahn or
John Binns. Thus, under Binns and Spahn, an article may be so infected with fiction, dramatization
or embellishment that it cannot be said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception.”),
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1967), Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 103
N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913), and Porco v Lifetime Entertainment Servs., LLC, 147 A.D.3d 1253 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2017), with Costanza v. Seinfeld, 279 A.D.2d 255, 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (“[W]orks of fiction
do not fall within the narrow scope of the statutory definitions [in sections 50 and 51] of ‘advertising’
or ‘trade’.”). In a case decided under Michigan law, the Eleventh Circuit held that a fictionalized
biography of Rosa Parks was protected from a common law right of publicity/privacy claim by a
“qualified privilege to report on matters in the public interest.” Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self
Dev. v. Target Corp., 812 F.3d 824, 827, 831 (11th Cir. 2016) (“As for the sixth book, Rosa Parks:
Childhood of Famous Americans, by Kathleen Kudlinski, it is a fictionalized biography meant to
introduce children to the importance of Parks, so it, too, concerns a matter of public interest.”).
15 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (Deering 2020); IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(B) (2019); New
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 310 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In this case, USA
Today’s and The Star’s use of the New Kids’ name was ‘in connection with’ news accounts: The Star
ran concurrent articles on the New Kids along with its 900-number poll, while USA Today promised
a subsequent story on the popularity of various members of the singing group. Both papers also have
an established track record of polling their readers and then reporting the poll results as part of a
later news story. The New Kids’ misappropriation claims are barred by California Civil Code section
3344(d).”); Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552 (“[W]e have made clear that [New York Civil Rights Law
section 50 and 51] do not apply to reports of newsworthy events or matters of public interest . . . . This
is because a newsworthy article is not deemed produced for the purposes of advertising or trade.”);
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 793 (1995) (“Like the common law
cause of action, the statutory cause of action specifically exempts from liability the use of a name or
likeness in connection with the reporting of a matter in the public interest.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
16 See, e.g., Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst., 812 F.3d at 827, 831 (multiple books about Rosa Parks).
17 See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (fictionalized biography
called RUSH); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Agatha novel (and
film)); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1970) (Compulsion novel (and film)).
18 See Joplin Enterprises v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349, 350-51 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (“Janis is a twoact play about Janis Joplin . . . . Act I fictionally portrays Ms. Joplin’s experiences over the course of
a day previous to an evening’s concert performance. Its forty-six page script focuses on visions of
artistic inspiration and their colloquies with Ms. Joplin. Act I contains only one song. Defendants
concede, for the purposes of their motions, that Act II simulates an evening’s concert performance by
Mr. Joplin . . . . Under California law, plaintiffs cannot state a legally cognizable right of publicity
claim in this case.”).
19 See, e.g., Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016) (The Hurt Locker); Rosa & Raymond
Parks Inst., 812 F.3d at 827 (The Rosa Parks Story); Brown v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 394 F. Supp.
3d 418, 437-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (Whitney: Can I Be Me (documentary)); Cummings v. Soul Train
Holdings LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (television performance from The Soul Train
released on DVD); Vijay v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 14-5404, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152098
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014) (Titanic and Ghosts of the Abyss); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603
P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979) (opinion of Bird, C.J., concurring) (“This court must decide whether the use
of a deceased celebrity’s name and likeness in a fictional film [Legend of Valentino: A Romantic
Fiction] exhibited on television constitutes an actionable infringement of that person’s right of
publicity. It is clear that appellant’s action cannot be maintained.”); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250
(Ill. 1970) (Compulsion film (and novel)); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d
177 (Utah 1954) (Look for the Silver Lining); De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 21 Cal. App. 5th 845
(2018) (Feud: Bette and Joan (television docudrama)); Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Ct. App. 1997) (The Sandlot). The Supreme Court of California subsequently
treated Chief Justice Bird’s earlier cited concurrence in Guglielmi as a majority opinion of the court.
See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 n.7 (Cal. 2001).
20 See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). It’s unclear if the California Supreme Court
would have decided this case in the same way if the comic book depictions of the plaintiffs had been
more realistic. For comic book cases reaching different outcomes, compare Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110
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S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (comic book defendant liable), with Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277
A.D. 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (comic book defendant not liable).
21 See Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst., 812 F.3d at 827-28 (“collage-styled plaque that included,
among other items, a picture of Parks, alongside Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.”); Paulsen v. Personality
Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (“Thus, in the present case, where the poster
in question appears privileged by virtue of its public interest character, plaintiff has failed to establish
any clear legal or factual right, whether viewed within the context of either ‘right of privacy’ or ‘right
of publicity’, which would warrant the granting of the preliminary injunction sought.”).
22 In Comedy III, the California Supreme Court said, “[W]hen a work contains significant
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also
less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity.” Comedy III
Productions, 21 P.3d at 808. However, the court found that the Three Stooges’ image on the
lithographs and T-shirts in that particular case was not transformative. For examples where the
courts found images transformative, see Tiger Woods. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915,
938 (6th Cir. 2003) (prints of a collage painting); World Wrestling Fedn. Entm’t, Inc. v. Big Dog
Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420, 443-45 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (parody merchandise, including tshirts and mugs).
23 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Wis. Interscholastic Ath. Ass’n
v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 624-25 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing Zacchini’s limitations on the First
Amendment in a case not about the right of publicity but instead about a state actor granting exclusive
licenses to broadcast sporting events).

